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Chewing over in vitro meat: Animal ethics, cannibalism and social progress 
 
Josh Milburn 
 
Abstract: Despite its potential for radically reducing the harm inflicted on nonhuman 
animals in the pursuit of food, there are a number of objections grounded in animal ethics to 
the development of in vitro meat. In this paper, I defend the possibility against three such 
concerns. I suggest that worries about reinforcing ideas of flesh as food and worries about the 
use of nonhuman animals in the production of in vitro meat can be overcome through 
appropriate safeguards and a fuller understanding of the interests that nonhuman animals 
actually possess. Worries about the technology reifying speciesist hierarchies of value are 
more troublesome, however. In response to this final challenge, I suggest that we should be 
open not just to the production of in vitro nonhuman flesh, but also in vitro human flesh. This 
leads to a consideration of the ethics of cannibalism. The paper ultimately defends the 
position that cannibalism simpliciter is not morally problematic, though a great many 
practices typically associated with it are. The consumption of in vitro human flesh, however, 
is able to avoid these problematic practices, and so should be considered permissible. I 
conclude that animal ethicists and vegans should be willing to cautiously embrace the 
production of in vitro flesh. 
 
Keywords: In vitro meat; cannibalism; animal ethics; animal rights; food ethics; veganism 
 
 
Many nonhuman animals (NHAs) are, like most humans, sentient. Normative thinkers have 
used this fact when claiming that there is a prima facie wrong in inflicting suffering upon 
them. More controversial, but nonetheless well-supported, is the suggestion that sentience 
grounds an interest in continued life, and that, correspondingly, it is prima facie wrong to kill 
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NHAs.1 This idea not tied to a particular ethical outlook. To name a few, variations of the 
claim can be made on the grounds of interest rights (Cochrane 2012), abolitionist veganism 
(Francione 2010), the capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2006), or even animal welfarism 
.DVSHUEDXHUDQG6DQG¡HDQGXWLOLWDULDQLVP9LãDN7KLVLVQRWWRVD\WKDWDOOLQ
the animal ethics debate hold killing NHAs to be wrong, or as wrong as killing humans. So, 
for instance, Peter Singer (2011, chap. 5) holds (somewhat reluctantly) that killing certain 
NHAs can be permissible if they are replaced with equally happy NHAs, while interest-rights 
theorists, such as Alasdair Cochrane (2012, pp. 64-7), typically hold that (most) NHAs do not 
have as great an interest in continued life as (most) humans. For the sake of argument, 
however, let us assume that we plausibly have reason to believe that the killing of NHAs, 
prima facie, is an ethical problem. If we hold that the death and suffering of NHAs is 
ethically problematic, given that anyone living in the industrialised West could thrive without 
eating the flesh RURWKHUµSURGXFWV¶ of any animal ± human or nonhuman ± we would have 
good reason to believe that veganism is mandatory. 
We might then wonder what is to be done concerning the fact that the vast majority of 
humans in the Western world do eat the products of NHA death and suffering (though, 
thankfully, the vast majority do not eat the products of human death and suffering, or, at least, 
not in as direct a manner). The fact that human consumption of NHAs continues practically 
unabatHGVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHµDQLPDOPRYHPHQW¶2 has been unsuccessful in one of its key goals 
(or, minimally, what should be one of its key goals). However, it is possible that universal 
veganism is not the only solution to this problem. In this paper, I will explore a possible 
alternative approach; namely, the production of in vitro meat, or lab-grown flesh (hereafter, 
LGF).3 
The technology of LGF is currently in its infancy. In one high-profile project, LGF 
was produced through the use of stem cells, acquired from NHAs, which were grown into 
thin strips of translucent flesh. When a sufficiently large amount of these strips had been 
grown, they were mixed with other ingredients to form a burger, which was eaten by food 
                                                          
1
 There are exceptions to this, such that we can harmfully kill without wronging: Self-defence 
is an example. 
2
 This term should not be used uncritically. Here, I specifically mean those who share a goal 
of eliminating/grossly diminishing the use of NHAs for IRRG7KLVPLJKWEHFDOOHGWKHµvegan 
project¶ (Deckers 2013). 
3
 Also variously known as cultured flesh/meat, test-tube flesh/meat, carniculture, and 
frankenmeat. 
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writers at an August 2013 press conference. This proved that LGF ± flesh which does not 
require the death or suffering of any NHA ± was scientifically, though admittedly not 
economically, feasible. In the eyes of its supporters (assuming sufficient economic and social 
backing), LGF will in time become commercially available as an alternative to flesh acquired 
in more traditional wa\VSRWHQWLDOO\HYHQUHSODFLQJµQRUPDO¶ flesh in human diets. 
There is already a moderately large literature on LGF, and this has thrown up a 
number of worries about the technology, including fears about how LGF might alienate 
humans from nature, or about how LGF IDLOVWRUHVSHFWWKHµZKROHQHVV¶ of NHAs. I will take 
it that these challenges can be overcome (as argued in, e.g., Hopkins and Dacey 2008; 
Schaefer and Savulescu 2014) and will explore them no further here. Instead, I am interested 
in reasons why those already concerned with the GHDWK DQG VXIIHULQJ FDXVHG E\ µanimal 
agriculture¶ may be worried about LGF. I will explore three such objections. First, I suggest 
that fears about reinforcing the idea of flesh-as-food are coherent, but, especially given the 
fact that these are not worries about a right being violated, can be outweighed by the positive 
potential of LGF. Second, I argue that the fear that the process could  involve (or already has 
involved) direct harm to NHAs could be overcome through appropriate safeguards, a 
recognition of which interests NHAs do and do not possess, and the familiar ethical 
consideration of ill-gotten gains. Finally, I consider the objection that LGF will continue to 
endorse or even reify false huPDQµDQLPDO¶ dichotomies and hierarchies, and that this gives us 
a reason to oppose LGF. In response, I claim that this gives us good reason, contrary to the 
view of many supporters of LGF, to permit the consumption of lab-grown human flesh. This 
will lead into a consideration of the ethics of cannibalism, in which I suggest that cannibalism 
simpliciter is not ethically problematic. In closing, I will suggest that the prospect of LGF is 
one that animal ethicists and vegans should embrace, albeit cautiously. 
Before beginning, it is worth making some brief comments on methodology. This 
paper could be read as a straightforward enquiry into applied moral/political philosophy. If 
understood in this way, the paper explores how, given certain premises, we should respond to 
the ethical questions raised by LGF. It is thus answering the question of whether this is 
something that we, understood as individuals or as a society, should endorse, permit and/or 
encourage. However, this is also a work of social philosophy, at least insofar as I am 
interested in exploring the DSSURSULDWHUHVSRQVHWKDWWKHµanimal movement¶ should make to 
this emerging technology. If read as a work of political/social philosophy, the claims can be 
understood in the context of non-ideal theory. Even if an ideal conception of political animal 
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ethics would not include an endorsement of LGF (reasons we might believe this will be 
explored), ethicists and activists might nonetheless have reasons to endorse the technology in 
order to combat the actual (putative) injustices in the world today caused by µDQLPDO
DJULFXOWXUH¶, especially given the huge scale of these injustices and the apparent failure of 
previous ethical arguments to impact them. To date, the most complete published assessment 
of non-ideal animal rights has come from Robert Garner (2013). Interestingly, Garner 
explicitly (but briefly) mentions LGF as a possible non-ideal alternative to animal agriculture, 
though he expresses concerns about the current unviability of the technology (Garner 2013, p. 
136). As such, the present enquiry, if understood through the lens of non-ideal theory, gels 
neatly with existing approaches. 
 
The flesh-as-food objection 
The first objection to the consumption of LGF which I will consider is that it serves to 
reinforce the idea that flesh is something to be eaten.4 This is part of a wider concern about 
the use of analogue µIDNH¶ µDQLPDO SURGXFWV¶ by vegans (see, e.g., Turner 2005; Litwack 
2006; Fischer and Ozturk 2016). Though there is a considerable market for these analogues, a 
number of vegans avoid them. ThiVLVQRWVLPSO\EHFDXVHRIWKHµ\XFN¶-factor ± though there 
is perhaps something odd about vegans wanting to eat something designed to imitate (a part 
of) a NHA ± but because they do not want to reinforce false beliefs about food.5 Recent 
                                                          
4
 Matthew Cole and Karen Morgan (2013, pp. 211- ZRUU\ WKDW /*) ZLOO UHSURGXFH µWKH
IHWLVKL]DWLRQ RI PHDW¶ ZKLOH -RKQ 0LOOHU  FULWLFLVHV WKH WHFKQRORJ\ IRU UHLQIRUFLQJ
µFDUQRSKDOORJRFHQWULF¶FXOWXUH 
5
 Gary Francione is one vegan academic who expresses these concerns. The following (taken 
from an August 2014 post) is typical of the statements on the subject posted to his widely-
IROORZHGµDEROLWLRQLVWDSSURDFK¶)DFHERRNDFFRXQW 
I continue to get variants of the following questions: 
1. Do you think it is morally wrong to consume "fake" meat (i.e., vegan foods that 
mimic meat)? 
Ans: No, I do not. If the choice is between eating an animal product or a "fake" 
product, it's a no-brainer. 
2. If you do not think that it is morally wrong to consume "fake" meat, then why are 
you critical of it? 
Ans: I am trying to get people away from the idea that animals are "food" and that we 
need meat (or cheese) substitutes or else we are deprived of "real" food. I want a diet 
of vegetables, fruits, grain, beans, and nuts/seeds to not be seen as insufficient in 
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research (Piazza et. al 2015) has suggested that people justify their consumption of flesh on 
WKHEDVLVRI IRXU µ1¶s: It is natural for humans to eat meat, it is necessary for health, meat 
tastes nice and it is normal to consume NHA-derived products. As such, it is plausible that if 
animal ethicists want to challenge the practice of meat eating, it is the factuality, moral 
relevance and/or moral significance of these which they should target. Of course, it is hard to 
challenge any of those so long as vegans are perceived as individuals who are, despite their 
professed ethical beliefs, constantly seeking VXEVWLWXWHV IRU µUHDO¶ NHA-derived foodstuffs. 
One can easily imagine a meat-eater defending any of the four µ1¶s by simply pointing at 
vegans consuming µfake¶ meats; even vegans, they might suggest, cannot (on some level) live 
without flesh. 
The problem is arguably even more worrisome when it comes to LGF. This is not 
merely highly-processed plant-matter, but actual animal flesh.6 As such, it might seem that 
vegans have lost the argument if they are willing to endorse or permit the production and 
consumption of LGF. However, this would be a mistake. The best ethical case for dietary 
veganism, roughly correspondent with the kind of concerns with which I began this paper, 
builds upon an imperative to step out of a system which necessarily results in the death and 
suffering of hundreds of billions of sensitive NHAs7 and to work to limit that death and 
suffering, not upon a demand WR FKDOOHQJH WKH IRXU µ1¶s. LGF is potentially an extremely 
important development in working toward that former imperative, not least because it could 
mean that the average consumer is able to adopt a diet indistinguishable from a vegan diet in 
terms of resulting death and suffering but simultaneously indiVWLQJXLVKDEOHIURPDµW\SLFDO¶ 
Western diet in terms of what is physically on the plate.8 To appropriate and adapt an idiom, 
LGF allows society to have its cow and eat her too. To suggest that this potential for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
*any* way. I want to encourage the idea that animal foods are things that should 
repulse and not attract us. 
See https://www.facebook.com/abolitionistapproach/posts/838427262843696, accessed 5 
May 2016 
6
 Or, minimally, it is materially indistinguishable from animal flesh. Maybe what is necessary 
for something to actually EH µDQLPDO IOHVK¶ RU µPHDW¶ LV D particular causal story. This 
metaphysical question is one worth examining, but is orthogonal to the current enquiry. 
7
 Somewhere upwards of 50 billion vertebrate land animals are slaughtered for food every 
year, and many more marine animals are killed annually. These figures do not include 
animals killed in pursuit of food, such as male chicks killed at hatcheries. 
8
 I am here assuming that parallel scientific developments will allow lab-grown products 
other than flesh. For example, there have already been moves towards the production of milk 
without cows (Pandya 2014). 
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radical reduction of death and suffering could not outweigh a quite plausible (but certainly 
not overridingly-important) moral imperative to promote and endorse an accurate 
understanding of the necessity, normality, niceness and naturalness of NHA products as a 
part of human diets sounds suspiciously like a kind of moral self-indulgence ± a concern for 
(being seen to be) doing the right thing over and above actually helping others and making 
the world a better place. 
One might object that this is essentially a consequentialist argument: I am claiming 
that what is, according to the claims with which I began this paper, a very good thing 
(potentially radically reducing the NHA death and suffering which currently goes in to 
supporting the dietary choices of many people) can compensate for a somewhat bad thing 
(potentially reinforcing harmful and/or false views about NHA-derived foods). This is despite 
the fact that a great many of the most compelling approaches to animal ethics, including 
animal rights positions, are more deontological than consequentialist. However, this is not a 
consequentialist argument of the kind to which animal rights theorists will rightly object. This 
is not an argument that it is right to kill x animals for the sake of saving x+1 animals ± such a 
claim will come up against familiar objections about treating animals as mere means, treating 
animals as receptacles of value and so on.9 First, I have uncritically accepted that an 
endorsement of LGF will necessarily reinforce these troublesome beliefs about the place of 
NHA-derived products in human diets, but this may not be so. We can imagine a lukewarm 
acceptance of meat analogues alongside a condemnation of the troublesome beliefs this 
acceptance might be thought to endorse.10 Second, it is not clear that failing to condemn these 
troublesome beliefs actually involves the violation of any rights. It certainly does not violate 
the key and fundamental negative rights, upon which animal rights theorists typically and 
understandably focus,11 against being killed and made to suffer. And, even if we could 
formulate some kind of (suspiciously ad hoc-sounding) right possessed by NHAs not to have 
                                                          
9
 These traditional objections to utilitarianism have been redeployed by animal rights 
theorists (e.g., Regan 1984) as a challenge to consequentialist approaches to animal ethics ± 
PRVWQRWDEO\6LQJHU¶VXWLOLWDULDQism. 
10
 7KLV,WKLQNLVDQDFFXUDWHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI)UDQFLRQH¶VSRVLWLRQ6HHfootnote 5. Hanhui 
Xu tells me that, historically, though the monks at Chinese Buddhist monasteries would eat 
neither flesh nor flesh analogues, they would serve analogues to non-monks visiting the 
monastery. This approach ± nothing resembling flesh is the best, flesh analogues are 
acceptable, flesh is not acceptable ± seems coherent. 
11
 Even those theorists who move beyond these rights, such as Sue Donaldson and Will 
Kymlicka, begin with them (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, chap. 2). 
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potentially dDPDJLQJEHOLHIVDERXW WKHIRXU µ1¶s reinforced,12 it would surely be a perverse 
joke to say that this right should be deployed to stop the production of LGF, at least while we 
continue to live in a society where the consumption of animal products is the norm. The right 
would give us good reason to be careful about the manner in which we endorse LGF, but 
should surely not stop us from endorsing it. 
 
The animals-in-the-process objection 
Despite its potential for radically reducing the death and suffering of NHAs in the pursuit of 
food, the production of LGF nonethelesVUHTXLUHVDPLQLPDOQXPEHURIµUHDO¶ NHAs. This is 
because the process cannot start without the acquisition of NHA cells. In theory, there is no 
reason that the acquisition of these cells should require the death or suffering of any NHA; 
SURYLGHGWKHµGRQRU¶ of the cells is comfortable being handled by humans, they could feasibly 
be acquired without any displeasure.13 Animal ethicists may nonetheless remain worried 
abouWWKHWUHDWPHQWRIWKHVHµGRQRU¶ animals before, during and after the acquisition of these 
cells ± concerns will be particularly acute in cases where the NHAs are being used in the 
pursuit of profit (Francione 2010) or when they are hidden from the public gaze 2¶6XOOLYDQ
2011), both of which are conceivably the case with LGF. However, it is not hard to imagine, 
especially given that, plausibly, only a comparatively small number of NHAs would need to 
be involved and JLYHQWKHIDFWWKDWWKHVHµGRQDWLRQV¶ could be highly infrequent (or even one-
                                                          
12
 SXVDQ 0 7XUQHU SURSRVHV WKDW D µbasic right to autonomy¶ entails a right µnot to be 
represented as a merHUHVRXUFH¶7XUQHUSS-5), and thus condemns producing flesh 
analogues as in so doinJµwe are participating in the nonartistic representation of nonhuman 
DQLPDOVDVPHUHUHVRXUFHV¶ (Turner 2005, p. 6). I have doubts about her claims. She has an 
unsophisticated account of animal rights, apparently suggesting that µnonhuman animals have 
the VDPHEDVLFULJKWVKXPDQRQHVGR¶, providing we µavoid the absurd consequences of the 
more immoderate versionV RI WKH DQLPDO ULJKWV SRVLWLRQ¶ (Turner 2005, pp. 4-5). 
Consequently, she simply assumes that NHAs will possess this particular kind of autonomy 
right. Even if NHAs do possess the kind of autonomy right she imagines, which is not clear, 
the remainder of her argument requires greater defence: It is far from clear that, first, this 
autonomy right grounds a right against representation as a mere resource, and, second, that 
the creation of analogue flesh violates this latter right. 
13
 Cor van der Weele and Clemens Driessen (2013 LPDJLQH WKHSRVVLELOLW\RID µpig in the 
backyard¶ model of material acquisition. NHAs kept as companions and recognised as a part 
of a mixed-VSHFLHVVRFLHW\ZRXOGEHWKHµdonors¶, and then flesh would be produced through 
a kitchen appliance or local factory. There seems to be nothing implausible about this model, 
and it seems to be consistent with many prominent animal ethics positions. This idea is very 
close to the vision of at least some active advocates of LGF (Stephens 2013, pp. 169, 174). 
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off), that concern for the well-being of the NHAs involved could result in very tight 
legislation and very close scrutiny, meaning that we could guarantee the well-being of the 
µGRQRU¶ animals at all stages. 
A related but separate objection comes from the fact that the development of LGF has 
already seen the infliction of suffering and death upon a number of NHAs, at least insofar as 
WKH µGRQRU¶ animals were not offered a full life of respectful co-membership in a mixed 
human/NHA society.14 G. Owen Schaefer and Julian Savulescu, in response, suggest that 
µthis is fair enough, but speaks more to the faults of our society as a whole ... than the 
particular problems of [LGF@¶ (Schaefer and Savulescu 2014, p. 194). Furthermore, familiar 
considerations about the ethics of ill-gotten gains come to the forefront; our opposition to 
particular research practices does not mean that we are forced to forgo the benefits of this 
research once it has taken place. The history of science contains much brutality, 
environmental destruction and discrimination. Scientific research continues to involve the 
infliction of considerable suffering on NHAs. We may object to any or all of these, but this 
does not mean that we should seek to turn back the clock to a time when we did not have 
scientific knowledge. We may have some obligation to make amends for mistreatment, but 
that surely cannot consist in (for instance) destroying or refusing to make use of the scientific 
advancements which have already been made. If it were, everyone, including those to whom 
we should be making amends ± especially in the case of LGF ± would lose out. 
A final variation of the animals-in-the-process objection will be raised by those 
µDEROLWLRQLVWV¶ who reject, on a fundamental level, all use of NHAs, arguing that this is 
inconsistent with treating these NHAs with full respect.15 I do concede that people with this 
viewpoint will have reason to object to the XVHRI1+$µGRQRUV¶ for the gathering of cells for 
the production of LGF. However, I suggest that abolitionists are mistaken in rejecting any use 
                                                          
14
 In one study (Stephens 2013), for example, interviewed scientists stressed that the use of 
fetal bovine serum as a growth culture for the cells was something which would be overcome 
in future developments. This was framed as a problem with the technology/research at this 
time insofar as it conflicted with the potential goals of animal liberation. 
15
 This view is most commonly associated with Gary Francione (2010). It is worth noting that 
the position should not be FRQIXVHG ILUVW ZLWK WKH XQUHODWHG µ$EROLWLRQLVW 3URMHFW¶ VHH
http://www.hedweb.com/abolitionist-project/index.html, accessed 5 May 2016) of the vegan 
and transhumanist philosopher David Pearce, which is about the abolition of suffering, or, 
VHFRQG WKH ORRVHU VHQVH RI µDEROLWLRQLVP¶ DV D IXQGDPHQWDO DFFHSWDQFH RI FHUWDLn animal 
rights, and so the endorsement of the abolition of animal industry. It is in this latter sense, for 
example, that Donaldson and Kymlicka are sometimes described as abolitionist (see Bailey 
2013, p. 725; Garner 2013, p. 102), but they would not make the objection I am discussing. 
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as fundamentally inconsistent with respect. This is well-illustrated by Katherine Wayne 
(2013), who presents a series of thought experiments showing that the use of dependent 
beings (in her example, these beings are adult humans with learning difficulties, but the point 
is to reveal by analogy something of interest about our relationships with NHAs) is not 
inconsistent with a fully respectful relationship with those beings. Imagine that you run a 
home for adults with learning difficulties. Also imagine that, for some reason, the hair of 
these adults grows at 20 times the normal rate. Now assume that we 
 
NQRZ WKDW FXWWLQJ DQG SDFNDJLQJ >WKHVH LQGLYLGXDOV¶@ KDLU WKH WLPLQJ RIZKLFK ZLOO
vary according to the expressed hair length preferences) will help the home turn a 
profit if they sell it to wig and extension manufacturers. Assume that making this 
PRQH\ ZLOO PDNH WKH FDUHJLYHUV¶ OLYHV HDVLHU E\ DOORZLQJ WKHP WR SXUFKDVH
instruments of convenience, such as cleaning tools, or a family van. The money will 
DOVRPDNHWKHLQGLYLGXDOVZLWKGLVDELOLWLHV¶OLYHVEHWWHUE\IDFLOLWDWLQJWKHFDUHJLYHUV¶
provision of optimal stimulation[.] (Wayne 2013, p. 167) 
 
Given all of this, would we be displaying a fundamental disrespect for these adults with 
learning difficulties if we cut and sold their hair? Not necessarily, Wayne argues; indeed, to 
fail to do so might be morally suboptimal, given that it impoverishes the relationship between 
the dependent adults and the caregivers and makes life materially worse for both parties. This 
is desSLWH WKH IDFW WKDW ZHZRXOGEH µXVLQJ¶ these individuals. Wayne offers other, similar, 
thought experiments defending the consumption of NHA products (the analogy points 
towards egg consumption), the use of NHA labour and the institution of companionship. To 
be clear, the point is certainly not that the real-world uses of NHAs are unproblematic,16 but 
that use is not inherently inconsistent with respect, as abolitionists hold. If use is not 
inherently disrespectful, the question becomes whether a particular use is disrespectful. 
Because WKHDFTXLVLWLRQRIFHOOVIURPµGRQRU¶ NHAs could, in principle, be done completely 
painlessly and as part of routine (and mutually enjoyable) physical contact, and especially 
given that the use can be conceived of as benefitting (or be structured to benefit) the NHA, it 
                                                          
16
 Wayne is herself a vegan ± though not in the µprincipled¶ (abolitionist) sense ± who 
HQGRUVHVVRPHWKLQJFORVHWR'RQDOGVRQDQG.\POLFND¶VSLFWXUHRIDUHVSHFWIXOPL[HGVRFLHW\ 
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seems plausible that the use of NHAs for the acquisition of donor cells could be done in a 
wholly respectful way.17 
 
The false hierarchy objection 
The final objection to LGF that I will consider is that it serves to affirm a false and speciesist 
moral hierarchy between humans and NHAs, or at least EHWZHHQWKRVHDQLPDOVZKRDUHµIRU
HDWLQJ¶ and those who are not. The idea is that in choosing to eat NHA flesh, even if we do so 
in a way that is consistent with their interests in not being made to suffer and not being killed, 
we affirm a kind of pathos of distance18 EHWZHHQµXV¶DQGµWKHP¶; a kind of ranked hierarchy 
with humans above and NHAs below. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2013, p. 152) 
express this concern in terms of dignity, and this, too, can tie to the idea of a ranked 
hierarchy: Those of a higher status possess (some level of) dignity while those of a lower 
status do not (Waldron 2012). Even if we do not straightforwardly harm any NHAs in the 
process, in eating NHA flesh we throw up a wall, we create an us and them, we mark 
ourselves off as exceptional, more valuable, more dignified. Without doubt, this should be of 
concern to those who accept the claims with which I began this paper: If the claims are true, 
we should be concerned with dismantling the myths of human exceptionalism, the idea of the 
incommensurably-low value of NHAs when contrasted with humans and the idea of humans 
as uniquely dignified. We should not bite the bullet and accept a distance between humans 
and NHAs, but this leaves an apparent dilemma: On the one hand, we should want to 
embrace the technological promise offered by LGF, while, on the other, we should not want 
this support to affirm, reify or contribute to false, speciesist hierarchies. 
There is, however, a third option. It is possible to promote the production of LGF 
without endorsing us-and-them hierarchies when we recognise that, just as we could produce 
the flesh of NHAs without the infliction of suffering or death on any individual animals, so 
we could produce the flesh of humans without the infliction of suffering or death on any 
individual (human) animals. This point has not been overlooked in the popular and academic 
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 $JDLQWKHµpig in the backyard¶ model (see footnote 13) might be a good example of how 
this would work. 
18
 7KH SKUDVH LV 1LHW]VFKH¶V DQG , XVH LW TXLWH GHOLEHUDWHO\ LW FDUULHV ZLWK LW DOO RI WKH
connotations of the sneering, uncaring beings of a µhigher¶ rank looking down upon the 
worthless (human in Nietzsche, NHA here) objects of the lower ranks, who exist only for 
their use (see Nietzsche 2000 [1886], § 257; Nietzsche 2000 [1887], § I:2.) 
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literature on LGF. It is acknowledged by some defenders of LGF as a possible problem with 
the practice (Hopkins and Dacey 2008, p. 586; Schaefer and Savulescu 2014, pp. 197-9; 
Schneider 2013), and is also seen as a (minor) concern in public reactions to LGF (Laestadius 
and Caldwell 2015; Laestadius 2015).19 Donaldson and Kymlicka (2013, p. 152), meanwhile, 
simply take for granted that the production of human flesh would not be permitted in a 
society in which LGF was produced. Contrary to this trend, I suggest that the production of 
lab-grown human flesh should be permitted alongside the production of nonhuman flesh. To 
be clear, this question arises only because we already have reason to support LGF. If we 
accept the moral claims with which I began this paper, we should, first and foremost, be 
concerned with eliminating the death and suffering inherent in the production of NHA-
derived foodstuffs. This would be possible through universal veganism, but the adoption of 
LGF technologies represents another possible path to this goal. If we adopt this latter path, 
we can then ask how we can prevent the new institutions this will entail from participating in 
or perpetuating speciesist hierarchies ± the answer is that we do not ban the production of any 
kind of flesh. Nothing is off-limits: Human, dog, panda, chicken (mammoth?) ± to say 
otherwise breaks animal life into two, and creates (or continues to affirm) a pathos of 
distance. 
This conclusion may be seen to be problematic from the perspective of non-ideal 
theory, at least insofar as the possibility of (even victimless) cannibalism is likely to be 
strongly resisted.20 A key component of non-ideal theory is feasibility. This means that if the 
achievement of a world in which both human and nonhuman LGF was permissible would be 
more difficult than the achievement of a world in which nonhuman-but-not-human LGF was 
permissible, then we would have a pro tanto reason, grounded in non-ideal theory, to favour 
the latter over the former. However, non-ideal theory is a process, and an important feature 
(in addition to feasibility) of non-ideal approaches is their focus upon the most egregious of 
injustices.21 As such, and given the egregiousness of the injustice of the infliction of death 
and suffering upon NHAs when compared with the injustice of the creation of an artificial 
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 There are exceptions to this general trend. Carolyn S. Mattick and Braden R. Allenby 
(2012), for instance, seem mostly untroubled by the prospect of cannibalism. 
20
 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
21
 This, in my view, is underdeveloped in much literature on non-ideal theory, but exploring 
this claim will take me off-topic. The idea is present in Rawls, for whom courses of action in 
non-ideal theory must be morally permissible, and for whom µWKHPRUDOSHUPLVVLELOLW\of a 
FRXUVHRIDFWLRQ«LVDfunction of the degree to which it removes the most grievous or most 
urgent injustice, the one that depDUWVWKHPRVWIURPLGHDOWKHRU\¶ (Garner 2013, p. 13). 
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pathos of distance, it is plausible that full support of the permissibility of victimless 
cannibalism ± of which I here lay the groundwork ± should come only once LGF has become 
established. To be clear, LGF with nonhuman-but-not-human flesh is clearly preferable to the 
status quo, as it removes certain major injustices faced by NHAs, but LGF with both human 
and nonhuman flesh would be preferable to either, as it removes these major injustices and a 
further injustice. As such, I take it that support for victimless cannibalism can be a part of 
non-ideal theory, even if ± as is plausible ± it is part of a more-ideal non-ideal theory than is 
nonhuman-but-not-human LGF. 
There may even be other reasons to support the possibility of victimless cannibalism 
beyond the relatively simple concern for designing the new institution so that it does not 
participate in traditional speciesist hierarchies. Libertarians, too, may endorse the 
permissibility of the creation and use of human flesh: Producing flesh in the lab does not 
VHHP WR YLRODWH DQ\RQH¶V EDVLF ULJKWV DQG VR (the libertarian would say) the state has no 
business banning it, no matter how offensive some may find the idea. Gourmands and others 
who stress particular kinds of value in food might even see a positive value in the creation 
and subsequent consumption of human flesh, if they hold that experiencing a diverse array of 
foodstuffs ± including, or perhaps especially, taboo foodstuffs ± is valuable. This suggests a 
possible shared goal and uneasy alliance between two groups who have previously found 
themselves at odds: Vegans, who often believe that people should not be permitted to eat 
NHA-derived products, and gourmands and libertarians, who typically believe that they 
should.22 It is even plausible that those in the vegan movement would have a positive reason 
to support the possibility of cannibalism: LGF would allow for the victimless participation in 
a symbolic statement about humans as animals and the rejection of speciesist hierarchies ± 
the consumption or use of human flesh. Whether there would be a more practical value (for 
example, if the symbolic statement would or could serve to convince others) is a question for 
social scientists, and one worth asking. If the symbolic consumption of human flesh would 
turn people away from respectful treatment of NHAs then we may have good moral reason 
not to participate in the consumption of human flesh, even if we would nonetheless be 
                                                          
22
 Here, I am generalising. While many libertarian political philosophers have written 
disparagingly about animal ethics/animal rights positions and in support of flesh-consumption 
(e.g., Lomasky 2013; Machan 2004; Narveson 1987), Robert Nozick was at least somewhat 
open to strong ethical obligations towards NHAs (Milburn forthcoming-a), and some 
philosophers have deployed right libertarian tools in defence of NHAs or as a solution to 
problems in animal ethics (e.g. Ebert and Machan 2012; Milburn 2014). 
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permitted to do so. While I can see little reason to say that anyone would have an obligation 
to consume human flesh, it is at least plausible that those concerned with challenging meat-
eating have a second reason to support the institution of LGF beyond its potential to end the 
suffering and death in µanimal agriculture¶. 
My argument may strike some as deeply objectionable. Nonetheless, I hold that it is 
valid: Assuming the truth of the claims with which I began the paper, we should want to see 
NHA suffering and death radically reduced. This is possible through the development of 
LGF, but we should not want to see LGF reaffirm false and harmful hierarchies of value 
between huPDQV DQG µDQLPDOV¶. As such, we should support the permissibility of the 
production and consumption of human flesh.23 For the remainder of this paper, I will offer 
some arguments in defence of this victimless form of cannibalism. 
 
In defence of cannibalism? 
When considered dispassionately, it is odd that someone might be comfortable with the 
thought of the consumption of NHA flesh produced through means which entail high levels 
of suffering and death, but deeply uneasy about the consumption of human flesh produced 
through means wholly respectful to individuals. Though most people ± including most 
philosophers ± are likely appalled at the idea of cannibalism, it is surprisingly difficult to find 
any explicit arguments against it; as observed by Schaefer and Savulescu (2014, p. 197), it is 
generally simply assumed to be wrong. J. Jeremy Wisnewski (2014) argues that, though there 
are arguments against cannibalism in all major ethical traditions, all face conceptual problems 
or possible counter-examples. Elsewhere, Wisnewski (2004) argues that not only is the moral 
prohibition of cannibalism (in rational terms) poorly founded but (on Kantian grounds, at 
least) cannibalism is sometimes permissible. Nonetheless, he suggests, we may have good 
nonrational, sentimental grounds for opposing cannibalism (see further Diamond 2005). 
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 This need not be human consumption ± perhaps it could be fed to NHAs. In the conclusion 
of this paper, I contrast a LGF-consuming society with a vegan society; in so doing, I create a 
false dichotomy. We may reasonably desire the creation of LGF in a society in which every 
human is a vegan; we may need to feed flesh to our companions (see Milburn 2015, 
forthcoming-b), or LGF may provide a useful practical tool when it comes to aiding free-
living NHAs (see further Horta 2013). 
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Leon Kass (1997) offers a spirited defence of these nonrational grounds in asking us 
WR FDOO XSRQ WKH µZLVGRP RI UHSXJQDQFH¶. There are, he claims, a number of things which 
evoke a particularly powerful disgust reaction, and ignoring or attempting to discredit this 
disgust is deeply foolish; even, perhaps, attempting to rationally articulate our opposition 
makes a mistake:  
 
Can anyone really give an argument fully adequate to the horror which is father-
daughter incest (even with consent), or having sex with animals, or mutilating a 
corpse, or eating human flesh, or even just (just!) raping or murdering another human 
being? (Kass 1997, p. 20) 
 
Martha Nussbaum (2004, p. 80), criticising .DVV¶VYLHZV draws attention to the curiosity of 
this list; rape and murder necessarily, and acts of father-daughter incest, bestiality and 
cannibalism typically,24 seem to involve straightforward (Millian) harms. Corpse 
interference, RIZKLFKFDQQLEDOLVPFDQEHDµgruesome variant¶ (Nussbaum 2004, p. 80), does 
raise normative questions, but these are moral issues which can be articulated and 
understood; surely it is not a topic about which no rational argument can be offered. To 
simply say that a disgust reaction most have towards these practices is enough to condemn 
them seems weak. 
Here, perhaps, it will be useful to disentangle several different forms of cannibalism. 
The most obvious examples, I think, come from violence scenarios and corpse interference 
scenarios, with waste scenarios being a third category. The distinction comes from whether 
the flesh is acquired from a human deliberately killed/mutilated for the purposes of 
cannibalism (violence), a corpse (corpse interference) or a part of the body which was 
removed for some reason unrelated to cannibalism (waste). In violence cases, someone 
inflicts violence upon A so that someone may eat part of A¶VERG\Literary stereotypes bring 
to mind non-consensual violence cases; a real-world example is that of Tom Dudley and 
Edwin Stephens, shipwrecked sailors who, in 1884, killed and ate the comatose Richard 
Parker. Consensual violence cases are also possible; Armin Meiwes is a German man who 
notoriously killed and ate Bernd BrandesVXSSRVHGO\ZLWK%UDQGHV¶VSHUPLVVLRQ It might be 
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 For thoughtful analyses of incest and bestiality respectively, see Sebo 2006 and Milligan 
2011. 
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held that the case stretches the limits of what one might consent to, but consensual waste 
cases are likely less controversial: If A is having part of her body removed for some reason, it 
is conceivable that she could consent to it being consumed by B (in a non-consensual waste 
FDVH % ZRXOG FRQVXPH $¶V ERG\ SDUW without permission). Possibilities like this are, in a 
sense, already practiced; some women, after giving birth, permit others to cook and eat their 
placentas. Non-consensual corpse interference brings to mind the famous cases of the 
Donnor Party (American pioneers who endured a harsh winter with limited supplies in 1846-
7) and the Andes flight disaster (a 1972 plane crash). Consensual corpse interference cases 
entail someone giving consent for their corpse to be cannibalised upon their death. 
In terms of ethical evaluation, all cannibalism cases can be questioned on the grounds 
of human health, but to condemn or ban cannibalism on these grounds strikes me as the worst 
kind of paternalism.25 Non-consensual violence cases can be censured simply for their 
violence, though mitigating circumstances (such as necessity) can possibly lessen the pro 
tanto wrongness. Worries about the wrongness of interference with corpses also loom in 
many violence or corpse-interference cases. (Arguably, they are also a problem in waste 
FDVHVJLYHQWKDWWKHµZDVWH¶ product is, in a sense, part of a corpse, though the person from 
which it is taken is likely still living.) A full analysis of the ethics of interfering with corpses 
is beyond the scope of the present exploration, but the problem can be circumvented with the 
observation that LGF does not seem to be a µcorpse¶ in the morally pertinent sense: It does 
not have a significant historical relationship with a living person, nor does it have the same 
sentimental or spiritual value to those who had some relationship (or shared cultural 
identity26) with the dead person. Problems tied to consent also do not seem to be present in 
the LGF case; while someone arguably cannot consent to being killed, it is a stretch to say 
that they cannot consent to their cells being used to grow flesh. LGF cannibalism, then, does 
not fit easily into the taxonomy of cannibalism here presented,27 and does not seem 
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 Indeed, some may object to artificially growing NHA flesh on the grounds that a diet 
without meat ± no matter its source ± is healthier (with thanks to an anonymous reviewer for 
this point). This, too, strikes me as unduly paternalistic. 
26
 The importance of cultural identity to the treatment of corpses should be clear. 
µAppropriate¶ modes of treatment for corpses vary culturally from burial to open-air 
cremation to being fed to scavenging birds. Cases of culturally-appropriate cannibalism are 
often asserted, but examples are lacking. One verifiable but complex case is the Aghori ± a 
deeply atypical sect of Saivite Hindus ± who engage in the ritualistic consumption of 
partially-cremated corpses. 
27
 ,QWHUHVWLQJO\ LW GRHV QRW ILW LQWR :LVQHZVNL¶V  WD[Rnomy, either; it is not is not 
µemergency¶ cannibalism, µritualistic¶ cannibalism RUµIetish¶ cannibalism. 
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susceptible to the ethical objections offered. Perhaps the rational reasons we may have to 
condemn some other kinds of cannibalism (but see Wisnewski 2004, 2012) are not sufficient 
to condemn LGF cannibalism. 
Kass might respond simply that thiVLVVRPXFKWKHZRUVHIRURXUµUDWLRQDO UHDVRQV¶. 
Repugnance, he tells us, though it is µnot an argument¶, warns us µnot to transgress what is 
unspeakably profound¶ (Kass 1997, p. 20). So even if we might have rational arguments for 
the permissibility of cannibalism, we should resist them. I do not deny that we should take 
notice of deep-seated moral intuitions and feelings of disgust when faced with ethical 
problems, and it is surely true that many share deep-seated moral intuitions and feelings of 
disgust at the thought of cannibalism, even victimless cannibalism.28 One solution here would 
be to simply say that these feelings of disgust and moral outrage should give way to either the 
greater benefit (both to those NHAs no lRQJHULPSOLFLWO\GHQLJUDWHGRUµothered¶ and to those 
humans who, for whatever reason, want to eat human flesh) or the better argument in favour 
of permitting the consumption of human flesh. These responses, respectively, may be 
convincing to those of a consequentialist or rationalist inclination. Another approach, likely 
amenable to those who put high-stock in moral intuitions, would be to say that, even though 
we do have strong intuitions against cannibalism, these particular intuitions are surely not the 
kinds of primary ethical truths upon which we should be building ethical systems. By 
contrast, the arguments which have led up to this point could be framed around much more 
central intuitions about the badness of suffering and the merits of treating like cases alike. 
Kass would decry these arguments as failing to challenge UHSXJQDQFH¶VZLVGRP µThe burden 
of moral argument¶, he says, µmust fall entirely on those who want to declare the widespread 
repugnances of humankind to be mere timidity or superstition¶ (Kass 1997, p. 21). However, 
in addition to the arguments offered above, I hold that we do have a good reason to challenge 
tKHµwisdom¶ of the repugnance humans feel towards cannibalism. Specifically, I believe that 
the intuition is vulnerable to an evolutionary debunking argument. 
Evolutionary debunking arguments are used in normative ethics to undermine certain 
ethical intuitions. Very simply, the thought is that if we have a compelling reason to believe 
that we hold a particular intuition because holding said intuition serves to increase our 
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 According to Patrick D. Hopkins, some µpurist vegans¶ (Hopkins 2015, p. 268) who oppose 
LGF play on this disgust reaction by raising the question of cannibalism in the first place; he 
is correct that this move has effectiveness because of µprimal evolved disgust responses¶ 
(Hopkins 2015, p. 269). 
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survival chances, then the intuition is partially undermined (at least when compared to other 
intuitions) as one upon which to build ethical arguments. This is because evolution drives the 
development of traits which increase the likelihood of gene replication, not the development 
of good morality. It is my contention that our intuitions against cannibalism are a particularly 
good example of intuitions vulnerable to evolutionary debunking arguments. Cannibalism 
would traditionally have involved interfering with human corpses, something which puts the 
cannibal at significant risk (greater than that associated with scavenging from NHA 
corpses29) of catching diseases. Scavenging from human corpses also likely puts the cannibal 
at risk of ostracism (or worse) from human society: Others may resent the cannibal for a 
perceived slight on the deceased, fear her due to a perceived difference, be disgusted by her 
due to their own evolved tendencies, or fear the spread of disease (rationally or instinctively). 
All of these could lead to ostracism, meaning ± given that humans thrive with others ± that 
evolution will disfavour cannibalism. If the cannibal instead procures human flesh by 
inflicting violence upon living humans, she faces many of the same health risks but 
additionally faces violence or ostracism in defence or retaliation. 
We have, then, a highly plausible evolutionary story for our moral intuitions and 
feelings of disgust concerning cannibalism. To an extent, our intuitions are vindicated:30 
Cannibalism typically (perhaps even simpliciter) is bad for our health, and typically would 
lead to ostracism. However, we have a dearth of convincing rational arguments against 
cannibalism in-and-of-itself. Though we have good moral reasons to object to typical 
instances of cannibalism, these do not extend to LGF cannibalism. Furthermore, we have, I 
have suggested, good reasons grounded in animal ethics (and I have gestured towards other 
reasons) to support the permissibility of this limited form of cannibalism. Given all of this, I 
hold that our intuitions against cannibalism are vulnerable to evolutionary debunking 
arguments, and we should allow our feelings of disgust give way to good ethical reasoning. 
 
Concluding remarks 
                                                          
29
 The cannibal will likely be susceptible to diseases which afflicted the owner of the corpse, 
the corpse ± as humans are apex predators ± will have accumulated toxins, and cannibalism 
simpliciter is associated with particular afflictions. 
30
 I thank Jan Deckers for drawing my attention to this point. 
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Those who support the wrongness of killing or inflicting suffering upon NHAs have good 
reason to support not only the permissibility of lab-grown NHA flesh, but also the production 
of lab-grown human flesh ± the former because it allows us to move closer to a society in 
which no NHA is forced to suffer and die for the trivial pleasures of humans, and the latter 
because such individuals should not want our pursuit of this society to involve continued 
support for us-and-them hierarchies. Animal ethicists, then, have reason to look forward to, 
and support the development of, a society in which LGF is regularly consumed. I am 
compelled to offer two important caveats to this conclusion. First, this society may or may 
not be preferable to one in which humans consume only plant products;31 I have made no 
claim either way. (To put this point another way, I have made no claim about whether LGF 
should be part of ideal political theorising.) Such a society, however, would certainly be 
preferable ± assuming the truth of my starting claims ± to the current world in which sensitive 
NHAs are made to suffer and die for human food. Given that veganism is adopted by only a 
small percentage of the population in even the most progressive of nations, and worldwide 
flesh consumption (due mostly to the increasing affluence of certain non-Western societies) is 
actually rising, we have reason to worry that a vegan world could be a long way away. 
Second, the potential of a LGF-consuming society gives us no reason to believe ± again 
assuming acceptance of my starting claims ± that the consumption of NHA-derived products 
is acceptable in our current society, or to believe that encouraging others to adopt veganism is 
somehow a waste of time or morally suspect. To be candid, I do believe the claims with 
which I started this paper, and consequently hold that we as individuals should be vegans, 
and should encourage others to be vegans. Despite these caveats, and though I do remain 
ever-hopeful for the development of a vegan world, I conclude that animal ethicists should be 
prepared to explore and ultimately, but cautiously, endorse the production of LGF. 
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 This is a false dichotomy, and we may actually have reason to pursue a society in which all 
humans are vegan but we nonetheless produce LGF. See footnote 23. 
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